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Bayesing Qualia: Consciousness as Inference, not Raw Datum 
 




The meta-problem of consciousness (Chalmers (this issue)) is the problem of 
explaining the set of behaviors and verbal reports that constitute the so-called 
‘hard problem of consciousness’. Chalmers (and many others) think that the 
meta-problem can, and perhaps should, be addressed independently of any 
substantive account of consciousness. We take an alternative approach. Using 
the tools of Bayesian psychology, along with considerations from a leading 
Bayesian process model (‘Predictive Processing’) we first provide a substantive 
(but revisionary) account of consciousness, and then argue that the resulting 
schema directly explains the meta-problem data. This, in turn, provides further 
evidence in favor of the substantive picture itself.  
 
 
1. Methodological preliminaries 
 
The ‘hard problem of consciousness’ is the problem (Chalmers (1996)) of 
explaining how physical events give rise to the varieties of conscious 
phenomenal experience. The meta-problem of consciousness (Chalmers (this 
issue)) is the problem of explaining why we think there is a hard problem in the 
first place. It is the problem of explaining why it is that some intelligent agents 
																																																								
1	University	of	Edinburgh,	UK	




find themselves deeply puzzled by certain features of their own contact with 
the world - puzzled enough, in some cases, to announce the existence of a 
profound ‘explanatory gap’ between their best imaginable scientific grip upon 
how physical things work and the nature and origins of their own experience.  
 
Care is needed in setting up the meta-problem. We need to understand the 
meta-problem in a way that is (broadly speaking) behavioral rather than making 
essential reference to phenomenal experience itself. In practice, this means the 
goal is to explain the things we say and do, while bracketing the question of 
whether or not they reflect phenomenal experience. Specifically ‘meta-problem’ 
apt behaviors would thus include saying things such as ‘there is a profound 
explanatory gap separating my phenomenal experience and good scientific 
explanation’, and expressing puzzlement about ‘qualia’ – about why red looks 
the way it looks, or why pains feel the way they do, or feel like anything at all. 
Chalmers (this issue) thus describes the situation as one in which what we seek 
to explain are “dispositions to make quasi-phenomenal reports, where reports 
are understood as outputs that even a non-conscious being could make”. He 
claims that the meta-problem is “neutral on the existence and nature of 
consciousness” and suggests that it is fruitful to address it prior to addressing – 
and while suspending judgment about – the hard problem itself.  
 
We will take a different approach. We agree that everyone - whatever their view 
on the nature (perhaps even the very existence) of conscious experience - has a 
duty to explain the various behaviors of (apparent) puzzlement etc. that 
creatures like ourselves produce.  But we will seek to link our own explanation 
of the puzzlements (puzzlement behaviors) directly to a substantive account of 
conscious experience itself. Nonetheless, the account we offer should be of 
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interest even to those who remain skeptical about our attempt to grapple with 
the hard problem. For at the very least, we show why a certain kind of 
inference machine will be led to conclude that it is home to some very puzzling 
states that have many of the hallmarks of ‘qualia’.  
 
Which brings us to our title ‘Bayesing Qualia’. That title pays homage to 
Dennett (1988) who, both in Quining Qualia and in subsequent work (e.g. 
Dennett (2015)), has argued that qualia involve some kind of illusion. In that 
illusion, a disguised grip on our own patterns of response (e.g. to the 
substances we call ‘sweet’) becomes misleadingly reified as a kind of mysterious 
intervening state mediating between energetic stimulations at the sensory 
surfaces and behavioral outputs. In ‘Quining Qulia’ the response to that illusion 
was to follow Quine in eliminating such misleading posits from (at least) the 
scientific image. But in what follows we aim not to Quine (explain away) qualia 
but to ‘Bayes’ them – to reveal them as products of a broadly speaking rational 
process of inference, of the kind imagined by the Reverend Bayes in his (1763) 
treatise on how to form and update beliefs on the basis of new evidence. Our 
story thus aims to occupy the somewhat elusive ‘revisionary’ space, in between 
full strength ‘illusionism’ (see below) and out-and-out realism. If we are right, 
we do not infer that we have qualitative experiences because we see red, feel pain 
etc. Rather, seeing red and feeling pain (just like seeing dogs, cats, vicars, and 
even (Letheby and Gerrans (2017)) having a sense of self) are themselves 
inferred causes, constructed to accommodate the raw sensory flux.   
 
This follows Dennett in denying that qualia are just what they seem – raw 
givens on the basis of which we infer stuff about the world. On our account 
(like Dennett’s) there simply is no such thing as raw experience. Instead, our 
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brains construct qualia as ‘latent variables’ – inferred causes in our best 
‘generative model’ (more on that later) of embodied interactions with the 
world. But thus constructed qualia, we argue, are of a piece with other inferred 
variables such as dogs, cats, heatwaves, and vicars. This gives our story its 
slightly more realist tinge. Qualia – just like dogs and cats – are part of the 
inferred suite of hidden causes that best predict the evolving flux of energies 
across our sensory surfaces. 
 
We first (very briefly) introduce ‘predictive processing’ as a general framework 
for understanding human cognition. We then outline that positive, albeit 
revisionary, story concerning the nature and origins of conscious experience, 
depicting conscious experience as the rolling product of a process of inference. 
We go on to show why agents thus constituted will, when a few other 
conditions are met, start to display puzzlement concerning their own states of 




2. Encountering a World  
 
Our starting point is ‘predictive processing’ (PP) - a simple but powerful 
approach to perception, action, and learning4. PP depicts the biological brain as 
an evolved organ that continuously tries to predict the next states of its own 
sensors, using well-understood gradient-descent methods to steadily improve 
its guesses. Such a process results in the installment of a probabilistic model of 
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the distal causes (sometimes called ‘hidden causes’ or ‘latent variables’) that 
might be generating the sensory flux. For example, a system training on lots of 
sentences in a public language might be led to posit the existence of distinct 
classes of linguistic entity, such as verbs and nouns, each of which make certain 
kinds of sentential unfolding much more probable than others. Such a system 
has, to a first approximation, inferred the existence of verbs as a hidden cause of 
some of the regularities (compressible patterns) found in the sensory stream.  
 
When this kind of learning takes place in a multi-level architecture, lower levels 
discover patterns at shorter scales of space and time, while higher levels use 
those patterns as the basis for learning about still other patterns, spanning 
greater scales of space and time (Hohwy (2013))(Murray et al., 2014, Cocchi et 
al., 2016, Friston et al., 2017). Intuitively, this corresponds to a kind of 
increasing abstraction as trained-up processing moves deeper and deeper into 
the system. For example, lower levels might learn about lines and edges, while 
higher levels learn about shapes, and still higher levels about persisting objects 
(for a simple demonstration, see Rao and Ballard (1999)). Equipped with a 
good predictive (generative) model, these systems deliver not just learning but 
also online perception by the same process of minimizing ‘prediction error’, 
where that is simply the difference between current predictions and the sensory 
evidence. A coherent percept forms when a multi-level cascade of top-down 
guessing adequately accommodates the exteroceptive sensory data (from sight, 
sound, etc.). 
 
Finally, PP systems that can act upon their worlds can use those actions to 
bring about patterns of sensory stimulation, thus shaping the sensory stream to 
fit, and test, their own predictions (Friston, Rigoli et al (2015)).  Living 
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organizations are strongly driven by the need to maintain various forms of 
bodily and metabolic homeostasis (and allostasis). That means they need to 
anticipate changes that would threaten their bodily integrity, and take action in 
good time. For example, increasing body temperatures recruit counter-
measures (such as sweating or moving to a cooler place) that seek to bring the 
system back within normal (predicted) bounds before real damage occurs. Our 
own bodily states, as tracked by inward-looking ‘interoceptive’ mechanisms, are 
themselves key targets for prediction and control (Seth 2013), Ashby (1947)).  
 
It has recently been suggested (Clark (2017) – see also Barrett (2017)) that it is 
the constant inflection of outward-looking predictions by changing bodily 
information that explain much of the ‘embodied feel’ of experience.  Courtesy 
of that constant background inflection we encounter a world that is subtly 
permeated at all times by a sense of the bodily consequences of our own 
possible or unfolding actions. This delivers a predictive grip on multi-scale 
structure – in the external world – superimposed upon a second multi-layered 
predictive grip reporting on the changing physiological state of the body5. 
 
Putting this all together delivers our starting point. For what we have just 
described is an organizational form that will use both interoceptive and 
exteroceptive sensory information to infer important features of its own body 
and world. Such creatures turn out (see e.g. Hohwy (2013)) to be broadly 
speaking ‘Bayesian’, insofar as they probabilistically combine prior ‘beliefs’ (the 
generative model) and new sensory evidence in ways apt to minimize prediction 
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errors and long-term sensory surprise. For the moment, however, we must 
assume that all this takes place in phenomenal darkness. What we have 
described is just a robot that can learn about compressible (hence predictable) 
patterns at multiple scales of space and time, and that can use those patterns to 
predict and control its own evolving sensory stream. Such a robot has the 
capacity to recognize and preferentially seek out worldly environments 
conducive to its own survival and flourishing. But perhaps there need be 
nothing it is like to be that robot. Nor is that robot yet poised to make what 
Chalmers called ‘quasi-phenomenal reports’, or to express (quasi-express) 
puzzlement concerning its own ‘experience’, or to intuit (quasi-intuit) the 
existence of an explanatory gap. More is needed. But what? 
 
3. Knowledge of Semi-Opaque Mechanisms 
 
Clark (2000) offered an account that was intended as a solution to the meta-
problem, namely, an account of why conscious creatures might be puzzled by 
their own consciousness. At the core of that account was the observation 
(Chalmers (1996)) that creatures possessing a certain kind of genuine but 
merely partial knowledge of their own sensory processing mechanisms would 
be led to make just the kinds of inference concerning the directly-known 
presence, in their ‘experience’, of puzzling brute sensory qualities.  
 
The argument went roughly like this. Imagine a language-enabled creature 
capable of distinguishing between (for example) otherwise identical red and 
yellow coffee mugs using visual means. Note that visual discrimination and 
language production both belong to the class of easy problems. Now imagine 
that that same creature enjoys some genuine, but limited, access to its own 
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problem-solving strategies. Imagine that it can tell when it is using vision as 
opposed to, say, audition, smell, or touch, to solve a problem. In other words, 
it has access to facts about the sensory modalities involved in its own 
responses6. Now suppose that same creature is interrogated about its own 
successful mug-discrimination behavior. Knowing that it solved the puzzle by 
visual means, but not knowing any more about the processing involved, it 
would be forced (Clark claimed) to assert that “the mugs simply looked 
different”. If pressed, it could note that the visually-detected difference was not 
shape or size based. It will soon be led to assert that the two mugs simply 
‘looked different’ in respect of some other puzzling property X – one regularly 
associated with that mug, and with certain other items, but about which the 
creature cannot really say any more. For want of anything more to say, the 
creature calls that property ‘color’. These kinds of simplifying models, reflecting 
real but partial access to our own processing, are the source (Clark argued) of 
our intuitions and puzzlements concerning phenomenal experience. Such a 
creature is well on the road to inventing an over-arching concept of ‘qualia’ – 
puzzling brute features – colors, shapes, sounds -  apparently simply ‘given’ in 
its experience of the world. 
 
Chalmers’ (2018) response to that story is to doubt whether access to modality-
specifying information is up to the task. His reasons are two-fold, one very 
general, and one more specific. The more specific point he raises is that: 
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“in the case of belief we also have access to an attitude (believing rather 
than desiring, say), and it is not really clear why access to a modality as 
opposed to an attitude should make such a striking difference.” 
Chalmers (2018) p.24 
 
The more general point is that (from his perspective) all we have done at best is 
to explain a pattern of judgments (or quasi-judgments), not the existence of any 
actual qualitative states - see Chalmers (2018 p.9). 
 
Chalmers categorizes Clark’s (2000) approach as a version of what Frankish 
(2016)) calls ‘illusionism’. Illusionists hold that a solution to the meta-problem 
(of explaining the various ‘puzzlement behaviors’) will solve or eliminate the 
hard problem itself. Clark has been wary of the full-strength eliminativist 
reading, according to which conscious experience is itself an illusion. Rather 
than eliminating consciousness and qualia, Clark sought to explain how and 
why they arise, while simultaneously showing that they are not quite what they 
seem. In what follows we revisit this project armed with the new scientific and 
conceptual tools introduced in section 2 above.  
 
4. Imaginary Foundations 
 
Schwarz ((2018) (this issue) suggests that a Bayesian perceiver, in order 
successfully to conditionalize beliefs upon incoming sensory evidence (where 
that means transduced energies) might be forced to extend her probability 
space by adding a kind of new dimension – an ‘imaginary foundation’. 
Importantly, this foundation does not consist in the energetic readings 
themselves (the electrochemical signals registered at the peripheries) but will be 
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a re-coding of those signals optimized to act as a kind of efficient go-between 
in the process of conditionalizing high-level beliefs upon new sensory evidence.  
 
The best way to motivate this proposal is simply to note that in perception, we 
seem to become highly confident of something, where that something does not 
quite mandate high-level beliefs about the state of the distal world itself. Thus, 
to take the case that Schwarz uses to kick off his (2018) treatment, we can’t be 
sure that what we see – when we look out of the window and see the fountain 
– is water. It might be vodka instead. But we do seem to become very certain 
of something, where that something is, intuitively speaking, more like a bunch 
of phenomenal features than a high-level belief. Note that we should not say, 
for example, that it most surely appears to be water. For how it appears is itself 
answerable to all our background beliefs. To a differently-biased agent, it might 
appear just as if there is vodka in the fountain. What we need is something 
different, something cognitively slimmer, able to stand firm despite all that.  
 
Imaginary foundations are purpose-built to fill that role. They are purpose-built 
to be known with great certainty while not themselves being made true simply 
by states of the distal world. In so doing, they are poised to usher an 
appearance/reality distinction onto the cognitive stage. Creatures thus equipped 
would be able, were they sufficiently intelligent, to assert that despite holding all 
the phenomenal facts fixed, how the world really is might vary. Such creatures 
would also be capable (general intelligence permitting) of important new forms 
of counterfactual reasoning. The very fact we can entertain hypotheses like 
"what would I see if water was vodka" tells us an enormous amount about our 
capacity for counterfactual inference and hypothesis building. Science itself 
might reasonably be thought to depend upon just these kinds of capacities. 
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What’s most important for our purposes, however, is how such a process (of 
inference that includes imaginary foundations) might seem to the agent herself. 
Here, Schwarz makes a bold and pregnant conjecture. Imaginary propositions, 
he speculates, might correspond to the features that seem to populate 
phenomenal consciousness. In broad outline, the argument is easy enough.  
Imaginary foundations here act as a kind of cognitive go-between, re-coding 
electrochemical patterns in ways optimized for reasoning and action, while 
remaining almost as certain as the electrochemical perturbations themselves. That 
re-coding maintains maximal flexibility for top-level belief fixation, but plays 
the key epistemic role of presenting, in suitably compressed form, what was 
with greatest certainty established by the waves of sensory stimulation 
themselves. Much that seems puzzling about the nature and role of 
phenomenal features then falls neatly into place. In particular, Schwarz argues 
that it will start to seem (to that agent) as if the world includes dimensions of 
similarity and difference that are very securely known but that are not 
themselves fully determined by how the distal world actually is.  
 
Schwarz’ picture sheds new light on the argument from Clark (2000) rehearsed 
above. Recall that the mug-discriminating agent was forced to acknowledge 
that she was relying on something, where that something seemed not to consist in 
a fact about the world so much as a fact about experience. Schwarz’ picture 
accounts for this and shows, in addition, why such an agent might feel 
especially certain of her phenomenal experience. But to do full justice to this 
proposal, we must now consider an additional, and crucial, part of the 
predictive processing architecture that was omitted from our earlier sketch. 
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That part is the so-called precision with which successful intermediate level 
predictions are currently held.  
 
Precision, in these accounts, has been equated with the psychological construct 
of attention (Feldman and Friston 2010, Kanai, Komura et al. 2015). To attend 
to something increases the precision, confidence or certainty invested in that 
thing (Parr and Friston 2017), usually at the expense of other sources of 
evidence. For example, if I am sitting in the dark palpating a mug-shaped object, 
I will attend to tactile and haptic cues but not visual cues. Furthermore, I will 
know (report) that I am fairly certain that this is a mug and, more importantly, I 
will have (a possibly subpersonal) belief I have absolutely no confidence in my 
beliefs about its color. Conversely, and returning to the case from Clark (2000), 
that perceiver will now report that she believes she is seeing two mugs, 
different in respect of some highly certain but otherwise mysterious property 
whose behavior in other real-world situations is captured by the communally 
handy concept of ‘color’.  
 
All this explains, we suggest, much of our agentive puzzlement concerning so-
called ‘qualia’. The agent knows these mid-level properties (compressed re-
codings of electrochemical stimulations) with great confidence. But both the 
properties themselves and their degree of certainty (i.e., precision) are 
computed by entirely agent-opaque means. Crucially, the agent can also become 
aware of other ways the world might be, that are consistent with holding these 
elusive properties firm. So she can ask herself what it would look like if it was 
vodka in that fountain, and realize it would look  just like this.  
 
At this point, intelligent systems infer the existence of mysterious intervening 
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qualia. Practically speaking, they are warranted to do so. For qualia thus posited 
prove extremely useful, enabling us better to predict our own and others’ future 
responses.  As Dennett (2015) nicely argues, qualia now pass the ‘Bayesian test’ 
for presenting genuine, yet somehow strangely elusive, aspects of the world. 
From the PP perspective, they are just more predictively potent mid-level latent 
variables in our best generative model of our own embodied exchanges with 
the world. Crucially, they are not some kind of raw datum on which to 
predicate inferences about the state of body and world. Rather, they are 
themselves among the many products of such inference.  
 
In one way, this is a version of illusionism. If the term ‘qualia’ is constrained to 
pick out some kind of raw experiential data, then qualia are an illusions, and we 
only think (infer) that such states exist, But in another sense, this is a way of 
being a revisionary kind of qualia realist, since colors, sights, and sounds are 
revealed as generative model posits on a par with dogs, cats, and vicars. We 
return to this issue later in our treatment.  
 
5. Making It Real 
 
All this unpacks very gracefully in the modern setting of hierarchical Bayesian 
inference. The key move here is to appreciate what hierarchical inference brings 
to the table. Hierarchical inference is Bayesian belief updating under a 
hierarchical generative model. A hierarchical generative model – also known as 
empirical Bayes (Efron and Morris, 1973, Kass and Steffey, 1989) – implies that 
probabilistic beliefs at one level depend upon beliefs at a higher level. All 
intermediate levels in hierarchical inference now play the role of empirical priors; 
namely, prior beliefs that depend upon the bedrock sensory evidence.  
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Perhaps the most canonical example of hierarchical inference is when the 
higher level comprises a space of models or hypotheses that establish plausible 
contexts for inference at the level below. For example, I could entertain two 
hypotheses that constrain my inference about sensory evidence in this context: 
“I could be sitting in my front parlor” or “I could be sitting on a film set”. If I 
see white flakes floating down outside my window, my perceptual inference will 
be profoundly different under the two models (i.e., it is snowing – or someone 
is using a synthetic snow machine). Crucially, the empirical priors afforded by 
the second level of my generative model not only constrain my perceptual 
synthesis but are also informed by higher and lower level beliefs. For example, 
if I know it is summer (i.e., higher empirical priors); I will assign greater 
credence to the ‘film set’ hypothesis over a ‘winter snowscape’. Furthermore, if 
I see that the snowflakes do not melt when settling on warm surfaces (i.e., 
lower empirical priors), this will reaffirm the ‘film set’ hypothesis. As noted 
above, if we subscribe to a deep or hierarchical form of belief updating in our 
brains, then this lends us a remarkable capacity: namely, I can entertain 
alternative (counterfactual) models or hypotheses and effectively ask “what 
would this look like if I was in this situation”.  
 
Our intuition that there is a firm distinction between perception and belief now 
falls directly into place. What we think of as perceptual experience, this 
suggests, is nothing other than a set of abstract re-descriptions of the sensory 
evidence that are consistent with multiple interpretations of the kind that 
emerge as higher levels settle into a best-fit picture of how the distal world 
most probably is. Our ideas about perceptual experience thus reflect the fact 
that specific patterns of high mid-level certainty can be consistent with many 
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distal causes. The idea that perception and cognition are distinct processes may 
have its roots (and limited grains of truth) exactly here.  High mid-level sensory 
certainty constrains how we actually take the world to be. But advanced 
perceivers can deliberatively explore other ways the world might be, consistent 
with holding fixed those mid-level encodings.  
 
The nature of the effort involved is (from a PP perspective) clear enough. It 
involves the deliberate control of the precisions assigned to various low and 
high-level beliefs. The advanced perceiver may, for example, forcibly assign 
high-precision to the ‘vodka fountain’ belief, so as to become aware that that 
belief is actually consistent with the current (highly certain) set of mid-level 
sensory evidence – the evidence that normally supports a ‘water-fountain’ 
conclusion. Under such conditions, we explicitly understand that other states of 
the real world might nonetheless have given rise to the very same sets of 
incoming sensory stimulation. This confers huge cognitive benefits, plausibly 
including (as mentioned above) the pursuit of science itself.  In less advanced 
creatures such complex counterfactual probing is not possible. For them, their 
own ‘imaginary foundations’ are never held in focus while deliberately varying 
their own higher level beliefs. Such creatures will still conditionalize their top-
level beliefs upon simplified, stable, mid-level foundations. But they will not 
begin to make an appearance/reality distinction or become puzzled by their 
own qualitative experiences. 
 
6. Can Bayes-ed Qualia Stand the Strain? 
 
A natural worry about the story on offer is that it may seem to replace the 
actual experience of qualia with judgments of one form or another – for example, 
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the judgment that I am now seeing a red cup, or feeling a sharp pain. Chalmers 
(2018 p. 9) raises this kind of worry, asserting that despite the intellectual 
attractions of some form of illusionism “On my view, consciousness is real, 
and explaining our judgments about consciousness does not suffice to solve or 
dissolve the problem of consciousness”. As it stands this is not an argument so 
much as an assertion of faith. However, the same could be said of our own 
assertion that our intuitions concerning qualia can be fully explained by the 
Bayesian/PP story – at the very most all we have done, Chalmers may insist, is 
to have explained the patterns of judgment that deliver the meta-hard puzzle. 
How might we make headway with this kind of apparent stalemate? 
 
Chalmers (2018 fn 28) notes that in his (1990) he “proposed a “coherence test” 
for theories of consciousness, holding that the explanation of reports about 
consciousness must cohere with the explanation of consciousness itself. Here, 
we think our Bayesian story does especially well. For the various verbal reports 
(including the reports of puzzlement) flow from the same bedrock processing 
economy as do the simpler behaviors of other sentient life-forms. The brains of 
such animals would likewise infer mid-level latent variables capturing patterns 
in gustatory space, auditory space, visual space, and the various bodily patterns 
captured (when all goes well) by experiences of pain and pleasure. In all such 
cases, latent variables are inferred so as to deliver efficient (simple yet effective) 
means of selecting adaptive actions.  
 
According to our story, the reports of qualitative states by beings such as 
ourselves reflect just these kinds of adaptively valuable grouping of patterns 
registered in the sensorium. Importantly, detailed PP accounts here show how 
interoceptive information (concerning our own bodily states) continuously 
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impacts both exteroceptive perception and the selection of action, and how the 
self-prediction of our own patterns of reactions helps convince us that 
subjective states such as  ‘finding kittens cute’ are as real as the kittens 
themselves (see Dennett (2015), Clark (2016b) (2017)). 
 
Our distinctive capacities for puzzlement then arise because, courtesy of the 
depth and complexity of that generative model, we are able to see that these 
groupings (the redness of the objects, the cuteness of some animals) reflect 
highly certain information that nonetheless fails to fully mandate specific ways 
for the external world (or body) to be. We thus become aware that these states, 
known with great certainty, seem to belong to the ‘appearance’ side of an 
appearance/reality divide (see Allen (1997)). 
 
Chalmers (2018) also asks why, on our kind of story, perceptual experiences 
but not beliefs acquire such apparently phenomenal feels? Part of the answer 
here may relate to the extent to which perceptual states are impacted by 
interoceptive information, giving them an unusually ‘bodily’ feel (see Seth 
(2013)). But additionally, we speculate that this intuition (of a qualitative 
difference between belief and perception) is itself a product of the process we 
have described. Because we are able counterfactually to vary our own precision-
weighted processing, we can ‘see’ that the very same set of precise mid-level 
states could be consistent with different ways (reported at higher levels) the 
world actually is. The idea that there is a qualitative difference between 
perceiving and believing then emerges as just another unconscious inference 
rooted in our advanced capacities for deliberate precision-control and (hence) 





We think out story shows promise. It passes Chalmers ‘coherence test’ and 
accounts for the apparent differences between beliefs and percepts within a 
framework that is neither standardly ‘qualia-realist’ not standardly ‘illusionist’. 
Instead, our intuitions about qualia, just like our intuitions about cats and dogs, 
are rooted in patterns of inference that attempt to bring the flux of sensory 
stimulations under an efficient multi-level predictive net. 
 
What emerges is a picture of the paradigm conscious agent as a being who 
scores rather well along three key – but potentially dissociable – dimensions. 
The first is the scope and depth (and especially the temporal depth - see e.g. 
Friston et al. (2017)) of the generative model of worldly states of affairs. The 
second (Seth (2013), Barrett (2017)) is the extent to which the use of that 
model is itself responsive to interoceptive information concerning the agent’s 
own bodily states and self-predicted patterns of future reaction. The third – and 
the one we here identify as most important for the issues surrounding the 
meta-problem – is the capacity to keep inferred and highly certain mid-level 
sensory states fixed while varying top-level beliefs. This is what allows the 
advanced agent to understand that what she so clearly sees in the fountain just 
might turn out to be vodka rather than water, while remaining completely 
certain of the appearances themselves.  
 
It is the presence of that puzzling capacity – itself realized by agentive control 
over precision assignments – that delivers the ‘inference to qualia’. This occurs 
when, seeing that potential gap between this highly certain mid-level re-coding 
of the sensory evidence and our own top-level belief, a system infers the 
	 19	
presence of a kind of mysterious qualitative realm capable of strongly 
grounding while not quite necessitating beliefs about states of the distal world 
(or body). Our own qualitative experiences, this suggests, are not some kind of 
raw datum but are themselves the product of an unconscious (Bayesian) 
inference, reflecting the genuine (but entirely non-mysterious) combination of 
processes described above. Crucially, we do not infer that we have qualitative 
experiences because we see red, feel pain etc. Instead, the arrow of causality runs 
the other way. We see red because we infer a strangely certain dimension of 
‘looking red’ as part of the mundane process of predicting the world. 
 
In closing, we note that the staunch qualia realist may well resist our claim to 
have thereby sketched the broad shape of a solution to the hard problem even 
while allowing that progress has here been made with the meta-hard problem. 
The story on offer would then simply help explain why it is that some agents 
become puzzled (quasi-puzzled – recall Section 1) in the ways distinctive of 
debates concerning qualitative experience.  Such agents are making inferences 
based on their capacities to use precision-weighting variations to deliver a grip 
on counterfactual scenarios in which appearance and reality come apart.   
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